dalai lamah wrote:

> My preference would be for FPGA with more specialized functions

Here come my wishes:

1. Built-in tamper-resistant cryptoprocessor block with write-only
nonvolatile
memory. There should be no way to read this memory, neither externally
(through JTAG, SignalTap etc.) nor internally, because it should contain
a wide (at least 128 bits!) symmetric key. This block should have serial
input and serial output and encrypt its input data using something very
strong, say AES. It doesn't have to be fast, but must be as secure as
possible.

2. Configuration bitstreams MUST be encrypted to prevent cloning and
to open the field of data encryption to FPGAs -- today every moron with
a logic analyzer can easily crack a SRAM FPGA-based scrambler.
The encryption block mentioned above can be reused for bitstream
encryption too. In this case SRAM-based configuration would not be
a problem.

3. There should be a way to "destroy" the chip from its internals, i.e.
to make it useless. This could be a trurly physical destruction, but
if the cryptoprocessor's nonvolatile memory block were erased, it
would be enough.

4. Fuses, more fuses! JTAG disable, readback disable etc.

5. Partial reconfigurability.

Best regards
Piotr Wyderski